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1. Introduction
Elliptic curve cryptography [22,24] and eﬃcient computations of pairings associated to elliptic
curves [25] have given rise in recent years to pairing-based cryptography, an important emerging
ﬁeld in public key cryptography. A powerful new idea in pairing-based cryptography is to use com-
posite order groups instead of prime order ones. This idea, due to Boneh, Goh, and Nissim, was used
for partial homomorphic encryption in [5], and since then it has been used in a number of other
important applications including non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, group and ring signatures,
searching encrypted data, and fully collusion-resistant traitor tracing [20,6,9,10,27,7,21,29,12].
Initially, composite groups used in pairing-based cryptography were based on supersingular elliptic
curves as constructed in [5]. In this paper we show that it is possible to obtain composite groups from
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security problems.
Waters [31] pointed out that for certain applications, composite order bilinear groups based on
supersingular curves are insuﬃcient; for example, constructions that use composite order groups
that rely on the Symmetric External Diﬃe–Hellman (SXDH) assumption [2] cannot use supersingu-
lar curves. The assumption says roughly that Decision Diﬃe–Hellman (DDH) is hard in both of the
groups being paired. Note that if there is an eﬃcient isomorphism from a group G1 to a group G2,
and an eﬃciently computable non-degenerate pairing whose domain is G1 × G2, then DDH is easy
in G1. Because of this, it is not known how to use supersingular elliptic curves to construct pairings
satisfying the SXDH assumption; ordinary elliptic curves such as the ones constructed in Section 5
and Section 6 here seem to be necessary for such applications.
In this paper we show that while the Cocks–Pinch method for ﬁnding pairing-friendly elliptic
curves carries over essentially verbatim to the setting of composite groups, this setting introduces
some security issues that do not occur in the original Cocks–Pinch construction.
The goal is to produce, on input k, a “suitable” composite integer N and an elliptic curve E over
a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq such that |E(Fq)| is a multiple of N and the embedding degree of E with respect
to N is k. This leads to pairings e : G1 × G2 →μN where G1 is the cyclic group generated by a point
of order N in E(Fq), G2 is a cyclic subgroup of E(Fqk ) of order N , and μN ⊆ F×qk is the cyclic group
of N-th roots of unity in F¯×q .
We slightly modify the Cocks–Pinch method, adapting it to the case where we are searching for an
elliptic curve of embedding degree k with a point whose order N , rather than being a large prime, is a
product of primes congruent to 1 modulo k. For many applications of composite order pairing-friendly
groups, N is a product of two or three distinct primes. Our constructions are suﬃciently general to
allow N to have an arbitrary number of prime factors where some factors may be repeated.
Next is a deﬁnition of embedding degree that applies to possibly composite divisors N of the group
order |E(Fq)|. However, what we construct are elliptic curves with embedding degree k with respect
to every prime divisor of N , which is a stronger statement.
Deﬁnition 1.1. If q is a prime power, E is an elliptic curve over Fq , and N is a divisor of the group
order |E(Fq)| such that N is relatively prime to q, then the embedding degree of E with respect to
N is the order of q in the multiplicative group (Z/NZ)× , i.e., the embedding degree is the smallest
positive integer k such that qk − 1 is divisible by N .
In Section 2 we recall the Boneh–Goh–Nissim construction of supersingular composite order
pairing-friendly groups. In Section 3 we recall the method of Cocks and Pinch.
In Section 4 we construct pairing-friendly groups of embedding degree 1 from ordinary elliptic
curves. We note that the SXDH assumption can be false for certain subgroups of these curves by a
result in Charles’ [13], as discussed in Section 4.1.
In Sections 5–6 we construct pairing-friendly groups of order N and embedding degree k from
ordinary elliptic curves, using the CM method for an imaginary quadratic ﬁeld Q(
√−D ). We give
two versions. In the ﬁrst version of the algorithm, we choose D so that
√−D /∈ Q(ζk), where ζr will
always denote a primitive r-th root of unity. In the second version of the algorithm,
√−D ∈ Q(ζk).
Thus
√−D = f (ζk) for some polynomial f (x) ∈ Z[x]. We let s = f (X) (mod N), where X has order
k modulo each prime power divisor of N . This method gives a square root s of −D (mod N) that
does not leak additional information about the factorization of N beyond what was already leaked
by revealing X , a k-th root of unity modulo (each prime divisor of) N . We therefore recommend the
second version of the algorithm, rather than the ﬁrst.
In Section 7 we give the theorems that prove that the algorithms do what we claim. In Section 8
we give further remarks that address issues of security and eﬃciency. In Section 9 we give some
details of our implementations of the algorithms.
The construction for embedding degree 1 is the simplest. In this case there are no restrictions on
the prime divisors of N , and no information is leaked about N ’s factorization.
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We ﬁrst recall the construction of supersingular composite order groups from §2.1 of [5].
Step 1: Choose a square-free integer N > 3 that is not divisible by 3.
Step 2: Find the smallest positive integer w such that q = 3wN − 1 is a prime number.
Step 3: The elliptic curve y2 = x3 +1 over Fq has q+1= 3wN points over Fq and embedding degree
2 with respect to N .
3. Cocks–Pinch method
We next recall the Cocks–Pinch algorithm for ﬁnding pairing-friendly elliptic curves. See Algo-
rithm IX.4 on p. 211 of [19] or slide 22 of [17].
Input: a positive integer k; k will be the embedding degree,
a prime p congruent to 1 modulo k.
Output: a prime q;
an elliptic curve E over Fq of embedding degree k with respect to p.
Step 1: Choose an integer X that has order k in (Z/pZ)× .
Step 2: Choose a positive integer D (the CM discriminant) so that −D is a square modulo p.
Step 3: Fix s (mod p) such that s2 ≡ −D (mod p).
Step 4: Take an integer Y congruent to ±(X − 1)s−1 (mod p).
Step 5: Let q = ((X + 1)2 + DY 2)/4.
Step 6: If q is a prime number, use the CM method to obtain an elliptic curve E over Fq with trace
t = X + 1, so
∣∣E(Fq)∣∣= q + 1− t = q − X .
Since q ≡ X (mod p), the group order |E(Fq)| is divisible by p, and k is the embedding degree for
E over Fq with respect to p.
If q is not a prime number, start again with a different X and/or Y .
Recall that for the CM method [1,26], the input is a prime q of the form (a2 + Db2)/4, and the
output is an elliptic curve E over Fq with |E(Fq)| = q + 1− a.
4. Ordinary composite order groups with embedding degree 1
To construct ordinary composite order groups with embedding degree 1, do the following (which
is similar to what is done in the prime order case in Example 6.17 of [18], which follows §6 of [23]).
Input: a positive integer N (e.g., an RSA modulus).
Output: a prime q;
an elliptic curve E over Fq such that E[N] ⊆ E(Fq).
Step 1: Choose a positive integer D suitable for the CM method.
Step 2: Let
q =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1+ DN2 if D ≡ 0,4 (mod 6),
1+ 4DN2 if D ≡ 1,3 (mod 6),
(1− N)2 + DN2 if D ≡ 5 (mod 6),
(1− 2N)2 + DN2 if D ≡ 2 (mod 6).
Step 3: If q is prime, use the CM method to obtain an elliptic curve over Fq that has q − 1 = DN2
points when D ≡ 0,4 (mod 6), q − 1 = 4DN2 points when D ≡ 1,3 (mod 6), q − 1 + 2N =
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(mod 6). If q is not prime, start over with a new D .
Remarks 4.1.
(i) Since N|(q − 1), the embedding degree is 1.
(ii) In this case, the CM method produces an elliptic curve E such that E[N] ⊆ E(Fq). The pairing is
computed entirely in the ground ﬁeld Fq , which is optimal from an eﬃciency standpoint.
(iii) No information about N ’s factorization is leaked, since knowledge of N ’s factors was not used.
(iv) When N and D are odd, then 1+ DN2 is even. When D ≡ 2 (mod 3) and 3  N , then 1+ DN2 is
divisible by 3, so is not prime, unless D = 2 and N = ±1. This is why we needed to adjust q, as
above, in these cases.
(v) More simply, instead of Steps 1 and 2, one could take the smallest positive integer D such that
q := 1+ DN2 is prime. (When gcd(N,6) = 1, this forces D to be 0 or 4 (mod 6).) Given N , such
a construction would provide elliptic curves E with E[N] ⊆ E(Fq) for which q is about as small
as possible.
Example 4.2. Let D = 16, and let N be any positive integer such that q := 1 + 16N2 is prime. Then
y2 = x3 − x has q − 1 = 16N2 points over Fq , and has embedding degree 1 with respect to every
divisor of N .
4.1. Distortion maps
Deﬁnition 4.3. Suppose E is an elliptic curve over a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq , p is a prime that does not divide q,
and C is an order p subgroup of E . A distortion map for C is an endomorphism f of E such that
f (C)  C .
When distortion maps exist for a pairing-based group, then the Decision Diﬃe–Hellman Problem
is easy for that group. The next result, which is part of Theorem 2.1(2) of [13], shows that distortion
maps are common when E[N] ⊆ E(Fq).
Proposition 4.4. (See [13].) Suppose p and q are distinct primes, and E is an ordinary elliptic curve over
Fq such that E[p] ⊆ E(Fq). Let O = End(E), an order in an imaginary quadratic ﬁeld K . Suppose p 
[OK : O]Disc(K ). If p is inert in K/Q, then there are distortion maps for every order p subgroup of E[p].
If p is split in K/Q, then every subgroup of E[p] of order p has distortion maps except for the two (distortion-
free) eigenspaces of the action of
√−D on E[p].
Proposition 4.4 has consequences for the Subgroup Decision Assumption on the curves produced
above. Recall that the Subgroup Decision Assumption [5], commonly used in pairing-based cryptogra-
phy, says that given as input N = p1p2 and a description of a cyclic group GN of order N , no eﬃcient
algorithm can distinguish the uniform distribution on GN from the uniform distribution on its order
p1 subgroup. We discuss the implications of Proposition 4.4 to the Subgroup Decision Assumption in
the following remarks.
Remark 4.5. Suppose that E , q, and N are as in the algorithm above. Then End(E) =OK , where K =
Q(
√−D ). Now suppose that N = p1p2 where p1 is split in K/Q, p2 is inert, and gcd(p1p2,2D) = 1.
Let Gp1 be one of the two order p1 subgroups of E(Fq) that by Proposition 4.4 has no distortion
maps and let Gp2 be any order p2 subgroup of E(Fq). Let GN = Gp1 + Gp2 ⊂ E[N] ⊆ E(Fq). By Propo-
sition 4.4, Gp2 has distortion maps f ∈ End(E). Since Gp1 has no distortion maps, every distortion
map f for Gp2 maps Gp1 to itself. As a result, if eN is the Weil pairing, then eN(P , f (P )) = 1 if
P ∈ Gp1 , but eN(P , f (P )) 	= 1 if P ∈ GN \ Gp1 . This observation gives an immediate algorithm to solve
the Subgroup Decision Problem in GN .
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one chooses a subgroup GN ⊆ E(Fq) of order N = p1p2 such that its order p1 subgroup is one of
the two subgroups of E[p1] that has no distortion maps while the order p2 subgroup of GN has
distortion maps. If one chooses GN by choosing its generator to be a random point of E of order N ,
then the probability that its order p1 subgroup is one of the two distortion-free subgroups of E[p1]
is negligible. Consequently the attack from Remark 4.5 is unlikely to apply to a subgroup GN chosen
this way. Nevertheless, to provably avoid the attack we recommend that one always choose N and
D so that all of the prime divisors of N are inert in Q(
√−D )/Q. This will ensure that the attack in
Remark 4.5 does not apply to any order N subgroup of E .
Remark 4.7. Alternatively, to avoid the attack in Remark 4.5 one could choose a pair of distortion-free
order N cyclic subgroups of E[N], as below (and in [13]). This has the advantage that one expects
DDH to be hard in such groups. Suppose gcd(N,2D) = 1 and all the prime divisors of N are split in
Q(
√−D )/Q. Using the factorization of N , compute a square root s of −D (mod N). Let P ∈ E(Fq) be
a point of order N , let σ be the endomorphism
√−D ∈ End(E), let P− = (σ − s)P , let P+ = (σ + s)P ,
and let G± be the subgroup generated by P± . Since (σ − s)(σ + s)E[N] = 0, we have (σ ∓ s)P± = 0.
Then G+ ∩G− = 0, and G+ and G− are distortion-free. If both P± have exact order N (each has order
N with probability ϕ(N)/N  1−∑p|N 1p ; otherwise, repeat with a different P of order N), then G+
and G− generate E[N] and are the two desired subgroups. One expects SXDH to hold for the pair
(G+,G−). This construction leaks P+ , P− , sP+ , and sP− .
Example 4.8. In the setting of Example 4.2, we have End(E) = Z[i]. Suppose that p is a prime divisor
of N . If α2 ≡ −1 (mod q), then f (x, y) = (−x,αy) is a distortion map for each of the p+1 subgroups
of order p ≡ 3 (mod 4), and for all but two of the p+1 subgroups of order p ≡ 1 (mod 4). Note that f
is eﬃciently computable, without knowing anything about the factorization of N . As discussed in the
previous two remarks, while we recommend choosing N so that all its prime factors are congruent
to 3 (mod 4) to avoid the attack on the Subgroup Decision Problem described in Remark 4.5, if one
wants SXDH to hold one could instead take N so that all its prime factors are 1 (mod 4) and use
distortion-free subgroups as constructed in Remark 4.7.
5. Ordinary composite order groups, Version I
We generalize the Cocks–Pinch method to the case where p is replaced by a composite N . In this
version there is no restriction on the input k.
Input: a positive integer k; k will be the embedding degree,
distinct primes p1, . . . , pr congruent to 1 modulo k, and
positive integers α1, . . . ,αr .
Let N =∏ri=1 pαii .
Output: a prime q;
an elliptic curve E over Fq of embedding degree k with respect to N .
Step 1: Choose an integer X that has order k in (Z/pαii Z)
× for all i.
Step 2: Choose a positive square-free integer D (the CM discriminant) so that −D is a square mod-
ulo N . If k is a multiple of 4, choose D so that D is not a divisor of k/4. If k is not a multiple
of 4, choose D so that either D is not a divisor of k or D 	≡ 3 (mod 4).
Step 3: Fix any s (mod N) such that s2 ≡ −D (mod N).
Step 4: Take an integer Y congruent to ±(X − 1)s−1 (mod N).
Step 5: Let q = ((X + 1)2 + DY 2)/4 ∈ Q.
Step 6: If q is a prime number, use the CM method to obtain an elliptic curve E over Fq with trace
t = X + 1, so
∣∣E(Fq)∣∣= q + 1− t = q − X .
If q is not a prime number, start again with a new X and/or Y and/or D .
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(i) Since q ≡ X (mod N), it follows that the group order |E(Fq)| is divisible by N . The embedding
degree for E over Fq is k with respect to every divisor d > 1 of N , since X has order k modulo
every divisor d > 1 of N .
(ii) When k = 2, one can simply take X = N −1 (with odd primes p1, . . . , pr and Y ≡ 2s−1 (mod N)),
and take D ≡ 3 (mod 4) and Y odd to ensure that q is an integer.
(iii) The case of k = 1 in Section 4 can be derived from the above algorithm with X = 1, Y = N
when D ≡ 0,4 (mod 6), X = 1, Y = 2N when D ≡ 1,3 (mod 6), X = 1 + 2N , Y = 2N when
D ≡ 5 (mod 6), and X = 1− 4N , Y = 2N when D ≡ 2 (mod 6).
(iv) The fact that N is a product of primes that are 1 (mod k) is leaked in this construction. In
addition, a square root s of −D (mod N) is revealed from q, N , and E . We do not know how to
use this information to factor N , but it is a potential security concern. In particular, the exposed
square root of −D (mod N) must be taken into account in any security proof using these curves.
6. Ordinary composite order groups, Version II
The only steps in which Versions I and II differ are Steps 2 and 3.
Input: a positive integer k such that either 4|k or
k has a prime divisor that is congruent to 3 modulo 4,
distinct primes p1, . . . , pr congruent to 1 modulo k, and
positive integers α1, . . . ,αr .
Let N =∏ri=1 pαii .
Output: a prime q;
an elliptic curve E over Fq of embedding degree k with respect to N .
Step 1: Choose an integer X that has order k in (Z/pαii Z)
× for all i.
Step 2: Choose a positive square-free divisor D of k such that if k is a multiple of 4 then D divides
k/4, while if k is not a multiple of 4 then D ≡ 3 (mod 4).
Step 3: With (−Da ) denoting the Jacobi symbol, let
s =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2D−1∑
a=1
(a,2D)=1
(−D
a
)
X
ak
D (mod N) if D ≡ 3 (mod 4),
1
2
4D−1∑
a=1
(a,2D)=1
(−D
a
)
X
ak
4D (mod N) otherwise.
(By Remark 6.1(ii) below, s2 ≡ −D (mod N).)
Step 4: Take an integer Y congruent to ±(X − 1)s−1 (mod N).
Step 5: Let q = ((X + 1)2 + DY 2)/4 ∈ Q.
Step 6: If q is a prime number, use the CM method to obtain an elliptic curve E over Fq with trace
t = X + 1, so
∣∣E(Fq)∣∣= q + 1− t = q − X .
If q is not a prime number, start again with a different X and/or Y .
Remarks 6.1.
(i) Since s2 ≡ −D (mod N) and Y ≡ ±(X − 1)s−1 (mod N), we have DY 2 ≡ −(X − 1)2 (mod N) and
q = ((X + 1)2 + DY 2)/4 ≡ X (mod N). Since |E(Fq)| = q − X , the group order is divisible by N .
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degree is k with respect to every divisor > 1 of N .
(ii) The restrictions on the input k and on D (in Step 2) ensure that
√−D ∈ Q(ζk) (by Corollary 7.3
below), which then allows us to deﬁne s so that s ≡ f (X) (mod N), where f (x) ∈ Z[x] is such
that
√−D = f (ζk) and X has order k modulo each prime divisor of N (see Proposition 7.1).
By the deﬁnition of X we have N|Φk(X), where Φk is the k-th cyclotomic polynomial. Then
s2 ≡ −D (mod N), since s is the image of √−D under the following homomorphism of rings:
Z[ζk] ∼= Z[x]/
(
Φk(x)
) → Z/NZ,
√−D = f (ζk) → f (x) → f (X) = s.
This method of computing a square root s of −D (mod N) does not leak additional information
about the factorization of N that was not already leaked by knowledge of X .
Example 6.2. A good example to use is when k = D = 3 and N is a product of two (distinct) primes.
In this case, the construction reveals N of the form p1p2 with primes p1 ≡ p2 ≡ 1 (mod 3), and X
such that X3 ≡ 1 (mod N). Anyone can compute s, Y , q, and E from N and X . For example, s ≡ 2X +1
(mod N) (giving s2 ≡ −3 (mod N)). It is not known how to obtain any additional information about
p1 and p2, as long as X has order 3 modulo both p1 and p2 (which is the case in our construction).
7. Computing s
The previous algorithm made use of the next result.
Proposition 7.1. Suppose D is a square-free positive integer. Then
√−D =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2D−1∑
a=1
(a,2D)=1
(−D
a
)
ζ aD if D ≡ 3 (mod 4),
1
2
4D−1∑
a=1
(a,2D)=1
(−D
a
)
ζ a4D otherwise.
Proof. Deﬁne a function χD : Z → {±1} as follows:
χD(a) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
( aD ) if D ≡ 3 (mod 4),
(−1)(a−1)/2( aD ) if D ≡ 1 (mod 4),
(−1)(a2−1)/8( aD/2 ) if D ≡ 6 (mod 8),
(−1) a2−18 + a−12 ( aD/2 ) if D ≡ 2 (mod 8).
Let d = D when D ≡ 3 (mod 4) and let d = 4D otherwise. It follows from Theorem 7 on p. 349 and
Problem 8 on p. 354 of [8] that
√
−d =
d−1∑
a=0
(a,d)=1
χD(a)ζ
a
d .
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quadratic reciprocity, it is easy to check that when a is an odd positive integer, then χD(a) = (−Da ),
and the desired result then follows. 
The next result follows from standard algebraic number theory facts about quadratic subﬁelds of
cyclotomic ﬁelds.
Proposition 7.2. Suppose d is a square-free integer. The smallest positive integer k such that
√
d ∈ Q(ζk) is |d|
if d ≡ 1 (mod 4) and is 4|d| if d 	≡ 1 (mod 4).
The following result that was used in Remark 6.1(ii) is an immediate corollary:
Corollary 7.3. Suppose D is a square-free positive integer.
(i) If k is a multiple of 4, then
√−D ∈ Q(ζk) if and only if D divides k4 .
(ii) If k is not a multiple of 4, then
√−D ∈ Q(ζk) if and only if D divides k and D ≡ 3 (mod 4).
8. Remarks
We give some remarks about the above constructions.
Remark 8.1. As pointed out in [17], the Cocks–Pinch method is good for constructing elliptic curves
with arbitrary k, and many curves will be found, and it is easy to specify the size q of the ﬁeld Fq .
These favorable properties also hold with the above constructions.
Remark 8.2. As is usual for the Cocks–Pinch method, the group order in the above constructions is
approximately N2 (since q is approximately N2), so the number ρ := logq/ logN that measures the
eﬃciency of the construction is approximately 2. When using composite order ordinary elliptic curves,
§8.4 of [18] recommends using curves of embedding degree 1 to optimize eﬃciency.
Remark 8.3. Merely requiring X to have order k in (Z/NZ)× , while permitting X to have lower order
in (Z/pαii Z)
× , could lead to an easy way to factor N , as follows. If X has order ki in (Z/pαii Z)
× , and
j is such that k j < ki for all i 	= j, then gcd(Xk j − 1,N) = pα jj , so computing this gcd gives an easy
way to factor N . Taking X to have exact multiplicative order k modulo each of the divisors pαii of N
ensures that X has order k modulo every divisor d > 1 of N .
Remark 8.4. When
√−D ∈ Q(ζk) = Q(e2π i/k), Version II computes a square root s of −D (mod N)
knowing just X , a k-th root of unity mod N , so this s does not leak additional information beyond that
already leaked by X . If we had used the factorization of N to choose a different square root s′ 	= ±s,
one could use these two square roots of −D (mod N) to factor N . So in Version II it is important
to use the s constructed in Step 3. In Version I, to avoid this problem we choose k and D to satisfy
properties that ensure that (by Corollary 7.3) we have
√−D /∈ Q(ζk). Version I leaks a square root of
−D (mod N) (that is computed using the prime factors of N), but we do not know how to use that
information to give any information about the factors of N . Note that every construction of pairing-
friendly curves will leak a k-th root of unity mod N , by the deﬁnition of embedding degree and the
existence of eﬃcient point counting algorithms.
Remark 8.5. The CM discriminant D needs to be chosen small so that the CM method will be feasible.
Common choices for D are 1 or 3, but if one is concerned about very small D one can choose D > 200.
Small D give more eﬃcient computation, but may be more prone to attack [15]. Optimizations of
Sutherland [30] allow him to handle D as large as 1013.
840 D. Boneh et al. / Journal of Number Theory 131 (2011) 832–841Remark 8.6. Starting with s and deﬁning D to be −s2 (mod N) would solve the problem of leaking
information about s. However, this will in general give very large D (around the size of N), for which
the CM method is very ineﬃcient. That is why we start with (small) D and then obtain s.
Remark 8.7. Applications of composite order groups to cryptography rely on the diﬃculty of various
problems, including the Subgroup Decision Problem, the Bilinear Subgroup Decision Problem, and the
Decision 3-Party Diﬃe–Hellman Problem (see for example [6]). Parameters and curves need to be
chosen so that these problems are believed to be hard. In particular, one needs the Computational
Diﬃe–Hellman and Decision Bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman Problems to be hard, in addition to requiring
that N be diﬃcult to factor.
Remark 8.8. When k > 1, the groups constructed in Sections 5 and 6 do not succumb to the attack on
the Subgroup Decision Problem described in Remark 4.5, for the following reason. Since each output
curve E is ordinary, all its endomorphisms are deﬁned over Fq . For every prime divisor p of N , E[p]
is not contained in E(Fq), since the embedding degree with respect to p is k > 1. Thus all order p
subgroups of E(Fq) are preserved by all endomorphisms of E , and therefore such subgroups have no
distortion maps.
Remark 8.9. Given an output curve E , without knowing the factorization of N one can compute a
random point in E(Fq) killed by N , and it will have exact order N with high probability. Alternatively,
the algorithms could additionally output a point of exact order N (using N ’s factorization).
Remark 8.10. There are families of prime order pairing-friendly groups parametrized by polynomi-
als (see [3,11,14,4,16]). One would similarly like to obtain families of examples of composite order
pairing-friendly groups. However, this seems to be much more diﬃcult in the composite order case,
since knowing a polynomial N(x) that often evaluates to group orders of the form N(x0) = p1p2
seems likely to reveal a factorization of N(x0) for particular values x0 (if not a factorization of N(x)
itself). For example, if N(x) = x2−1 and is public, this reveals the information that p1 and p2 are twin
primes, and given N(x0) = x20 −1 it is easy to solve for the quantities x0, p1 = x0 −1, and p2 = x0 +1.
It is an open problem to obtain parametrized families in which the prime factors of the composite
integer N will be random, unguessable primes of the desired size.
9. Implementation
For our implementation we ﬁxed D and k. We took p1 and p2 to be 512-bit primes congruent to 1
modulo 4Dk (thereby forcing −D to be a square modulo p1 and p2) and let N = p1p2. We then took
j(p1−1)/k (mod p1) for j = 1,2,3, . . . until we found one of order k (mod p1), and similarly with
p1 replaced by p2, and then applied the Chinese Remainder Theorem to obtain X of order k modulo
both p1 and p2. If X was even, we replaced it with X − N , to obtain an odd X such that 0< |X | < N .
If X = −1 we replaced X with 2N − 1. If √−D ∈ Q(ζk) (as determined by Corollary 7.3), we used the
formula for s in Step 3 of Version II of the algorithm. Otherwise, we computed a square root of −D
modulo p1 and modulo p2 (using PARI/GP [28]), and used the Chinese Remainder Theorem to obtain
a square root s of −D modulo N . We let Y be (X − 1)s−1 (mod N), but if it was odd we replaced it
with Y − N , to obtain an even Y such that 0< |Y | < N . If Y = 0 we replaced Y with 4N; if Y = X + 1
we replaced Y with X + 1− 2N . Since X + 1 and Y are even, q is automatically a positive integer. We
tested q for primality. If q was not prime, we started again with a new p2.
Once parameters are obtained with q prime, one can apply the CM method.
We ran our program for all values of k between 1 and 40, with D = 1, 2, 3, 201, 202, and 203,
and readily obtained examples in all cases. In the examples we obtained with k > 1, the value of ρ
was between 1.992 and 2.006. For k = 1, ρ was between 2.00195 and 2.00943.
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